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Abstract   This paper concerns the behavioral modeling of the aggregated capi-
tal dynamics in the Danish fishing fleet. The emphasis is placed on testing the
impact of the after-tax user cost of capital and aggregated profit on capital dy-
namics in the fishing fleet. It is argued that the investment behavior is driven by
the incentives created by implemented tax and depreciation legislation. The
policy implication of the study is that a tax on capital is seen as an effective tool
in controlling incentives for overcapitalization in the fishing fleet.
Key words   Behavioral modeling, Danish fishing fleet, depreciation policy, in-
vestments.
Introduction
One of the important economic implications of open-access fisheries is the tendency
towards over-investment in fishing capacity. Regulators are, therefore, looking for
instruments to effectively control the fishing capacity. Within the European Union
(EU), one of the instruments used to reduce fishing capacity has been the introduc-
tion of a decommissioning scheme. That is, the vessel owners are given grants when
vessels are taken out of fisheries. In general, the decommissioning scheme could be
seen as a necessary ad hoc instrument for reducing the actual fishing capacity. How-
ever, fishermen still have incentives for over-investment in open-access fisheries.
One of the ways to approach the over-investment problem, as suggested by Wilen
(1979), is to increase knowledge of fishermen’s investment behavior. Thus, if the
policymaker understands which variables are crucial in the vessel owners’ invest-
ment decision, then this information could be used by the policymaker to implement
instruments that are constructed to change investment patterns.
The purpose of this paper is to estimate investment behavior of the fishing fleet
in Denmark. The emphasis is placed on an empirical analysis of investments in Dan-
ish fisheries, where the importance of tax and depreciation legislation and their ef-
fects on investment behavior are explicitly addressed. The analysis applies econo-
metric estimation of investment behavior based on time-series data on the aggre-
gated fleet in Denmark between 1960 and 1987. The primary conclusion is that there
are strong incentives for rapid investment in the Danish fisheries, given a combina-
tion of high tax rates and the possibility of depreciating vessels in advance (for tax
purposes) during the construction period.
The investment model is estimated by assuming that profit measures the general
tendency toward instant investment due to tax considerations. In years with high
profitability, the firm can avoid tax payments if it orders a new vessel. Thus, tax leg-
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islation allows the firm to depreciate in advance of the vessel being delivered. Sec-
ondly, changes in the tax and depreciation legislation during the period 1960 to 1987 are
measured by modifying the user cost of capital in accordance with Danish legislation.
Although the investments have a crucial importance in regulation of fisheries,
there are only a few empirical studies in the field. Related studies of the investment/
capital dynamics in fisheries have been undertaken by Penson, Tettey, and Griffin
(1988) and Bjørndal and Conrad (1987). The former emphasizes the importance of
the user cost of capital on investments. Assuming gradual adjustment and adaptive
expectations, they conclude that the cost of capital, and, in particular, the interest rate on
debt, has an important impact on the aggregated investment response in the Gulf of
Mexico shrimp fisheries. Bjørndal and Conrad (1987) emphasize the impact of profit-
ability on vessel dynamics in a neoclassical model. They conclude that vessel participa-
tion within the North Sea herring fisheries depends primarily on profit during the
current period. Although we have used different assumptions and data than in the
studies by Penson, Tettey, and Griffin (1988) and Bjørndal and Conrad (1987), the
results are related, in the sense that the economic variables of profit and after-tax
user cost of capital play an important role in investment decisions of the firms.
The paper contains four sections. The first section outlines the investment
model. A “desired” level of investments is derived, which is based on the aggregated
catch and the cost of capital relative to labor costs. In the following section, the
shifts in the tax and depreciation policies are incorporated into the user cost of capi-
tal. Alternative specifications are formulated for the user of cost of capital, both in
the presence and absence of taxation, for the econometric estimations. The descrip-
tion of data and results are next, with the final section providing discussion and
policy implications.
The Investment Model
In Denmark, the fisheries can be characterized as regulated; however, during the pe-
riod of investigation, 1960–87, it is assumed that regulation has no impact on invest-
ment behavior. Moreover, there have been no restrictions on investments in fishing
capacity. In general, the Danish fishing fleet comprised between 3,300 and 4,000 op-
erating fishing vessels.1 In order to understand investment behavior in Denmark, it
is important to note that the fishing vessels are mainly organized by individual own-
ership. This has the important implication that investment decisions in the fishing
fleet are based on decisions by each vessel owner at an individual level. Moreover,
when deciding individually, vessel owners are not considering whether there is a
general tendency toward over-investment in the common fisheries. Nor are vessel
owners considering the consequences their investments could have on the abundance
of fish in future, as stated in fisheries literature (Warming 1911; and Gordon 1954).
On the contrary, the focus of the vessel owner is to base investment decisions on the
main economic conditions that face them in the fisheries.
The fishermen are assumed to be price takers in the markets for outputs and in-
puts. By assuming profit maximizing and applying a log-linear production function,2















1 Vessels larger than 5 GRT.
2 The log-linear production function is used in reduced form in the arguments capital, Kt, and labor, Lt.Investment Behavior and Tax Policy 187
where the desired level of capital,  Kt
*, is influenced by the level of catch, Yt, and the
user cost of capital, rt, relative to the price of labor cost. A priori we expect that the
catches of the fishermen are restricting their profits. This means that α , the elasticity
of desired capital with respect to catch, is positive, whereby an increase in reported
catches will induce the firm to increase the desired level of capital in order to maxi-
mize profits. Moreover, it is assumed that β , the elasticity of the desired capital with
respect to the relative user cost of capital, is negative.
To formalize the relationship between net investments and the desired level of
capital, we use the fact that gross investments are the sum of net investments plus
replacement investments. The net investments (Penson, Romain, and Hughes 1981)
are, therefore,
IK K I R t
N
tt t
G == − − – 1 (2)
where  It
G represents the gross investments in vessels during the year, and R is the
real replacement investments needed according to depreciation on existing vessels
and the vessels leaving the fleet. The net expansion of investments in equation
(2) is measured by the change in the real productive value of the stock, denoted
by the change of the registered insurance value of the Danish fishing vessels
between successive years. We assume that the replacement investment, R, is
proportional to the initial insurance value of the fleet. That is, we have the rela-
tion R = φ Kt–1, where φ  is interpreted as the annual depreciation rate of the fish-
ing fleet. By applying the change in insurance value, net investments are mea-
suring the entries of new vessels into the fleet. It is also noted that the insur-
ance value of operating vessels is changed when modernization (net invest-
ments) is undertaken on existing vessels. Finally, the insurance value will be re-
duced by vessels leaving the fisheries. In this sense, the changes in the aggre-
gated insurance value due to entries and modernization, and the vessels leaving
the fisheries, are measuring net investments. Although the net investments are
measured by the insurance value, it is emphasised that we measure investments in
the period they are realized in the aggregate insurance value. That is, we are not able
to measure investments in the period in which they are initiated. In this sense, there
will be an investment lag that is explained by delivery lag, and is seen to be particu-
larly important for investments in the fishing fleet.
Investments can take either the form of modernization of existing vessels (lag
within 1 year) or construction of new vessel (lag between 1 and 2 years). This means
that the delivery lag will depend on whether gross investments are undertaken as
construction of new vessels or modernization of existing vessels.  In order to take
account of the different investment methods and delivery lags, λ 1 and λ 2 are fol-
lowed by specifying the distributed lags of 1 and 2 years,
IK K t
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tt =+ −− λλ 11 22
** (3)
where  Kt− 1
*  and  Kt− 2
*  are the desired levels of capital [cf. equation (1)] in the two
previous periods Weersink and Tauer (1989). As argued earlier, firms in Denmark
have the incentive to invest in years with high profits to minimize their tax pay-
ments by ordering a new vessel. The money that should have been paid as tax is
simply used as a 15% prepayment on a new vessel to be delivered in the future.3
This effect is measured by the gross profit. π t. It is expected that net investments de-
3 These investment incentives have been confirmed in interviews with vessel owners.Jensen 188
pend on profitability given an expected delivery lag of 1 to 2 years denoted by λ 1
and λ 2. Substituting equation (3) into equation (2) and adding the profit component
in the two previous periods, we have the investment function,
KK I K K tt t
N




1 λλ π φ * (4)
where the investment process is determined by the optimal desired capital and the
level of profit in the fisheries minus the proportional depreciation rate.
The general net investment model is derived by approximating the net invest-
ments from equation (4) to the natural logarithmic form, and by incorporating the
natural logarithmic form of  Kt
* from equation (1), we have,4
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where a = (λ 1 + λ 2) ln A; γ 1,t–j = αλ j; γ 2,t–j = βλ j; and γ 3,t–j = κλ j. Quantity κ  is the share
of profit used for investments. The error term, ε t, is assumed to be independent and
normally distributed with zero mean and a common variance σ 2. We expect a priori
that γ 1, t–j > 0, γ 2, t–j < 0, γ 3,t–j > 0, γ 4 < 0.
Following Bjørndal and Conrad (1987) we have measured the aggregated profit
using gross earnings normalized with the aggregated insurance value of the Danish
fleet; that is, the gross turnover per invested Danish krone (DKK). In investment
models, it is often suggested to use profit as an indicator of internal funding of in-
vestment expenditures. However, empirically, it is difficult to distinguish the role of
gross profit as a measure of the economic incentives created by the depreciation sys-
tem for tax purposes, from its role as a measurement of the available funds for in-
vestment. In general, there is no indication of restrictions in the external supply of
funds for investment in the Danish fisheries. On the contrary, a governmental insti-
tution, the Royal Danish Fisheries Bank, has been established with the purpose of
supplying loans to the fishing sector based on long-term government bonds. As a
consequence, the changes in gross turnover per invested DKK are considered an in-
dicator of the incentives created by the Danish tax system to invest immediately.
Investment Behavior, Depreciation, and Tax Legislation
Theoretically, we know that a tax policy allowing deduction of depreciation ex-
penses earlier than the occurrence of the actual depreciation expenses subsidizes in-
vestments. Thus, such a tax policy contributes to a positive net present value of the
effective, after-tax price of capital. The importance of the depreciation subsidy for
investment incentives is brought into perspective in Danish fisheries, where it is
possible to deduct expenses in advance, during the construction of the vessel and be-
fore the vessel is used.5 The tax policy allows for a deduction of 65%6 of the
vessel’s value as a depreciation expense within the first two years of the vessel’s ac-
4 Note that the input price on capital, rt–j, in equation (5) does not contain any tax considerations.
5 The depreciation in advance is affecting investments in the construction of new vessels.
6 This includes the depreciation on the vessel to be delivered in the future.Investment Behavior and Tax Policy 189
tive operation in fisheries (see table 1). This is significantly higher than the real de-
preciation costs expected in the Danish fleet, where the average time of a vessel’s
operation is about thirty years.
The shifts in the tax and depreciation legislation and interest rates are measured
by modifying the user cost of capital, rt, based on Leblanc, et al. (1991). In order to
test the importance of the tax and depreciation legislation for the investment behav-
ior, we extend the analysis of Leblanc, et al. (1991) by comparing econometric esti-
mations in which the user cost of capital is imputed both in the presence and ab-
sence of taxation. That is, we estimate two investment demand models: first, an in-
vestment model where the depreciation policy is not included in the user cost of
capital,  rt
0; and secondly, an investment model where the user cost, rt
d, is modified
for policy changes.7 By comparing the estimated investment models, we would a
priori expect that the model without the depreciation policy would be misspecified
if the missing policy changes significantly influence investments. In this sense, the
validity of the postulate that the fishermen include the tax and deprecation policies
into their investment demand is tested.
It should, however, be noted that the modification of the user cost of capital in
accordance with the implemented policy is complicated by the fact that we have as-
sumed distributive decision lags in our investment demand function (5). In general,
it is noted that the investment process is based on historic and backward-looking in-
formation. This means that it is difficult to measure the influence of a policy shift to
be implemented in the future (Chirinko 1986). However, we assume that the shift in
the depreciation policy would be announced beforehand, which means it would be
7 The detailed assumptions addressing the applied user cost of capital with tax  rt
d , and without tax,  rt
0,
are outlined in table 2.
Table 1
Danish Depreciation Taxation Rates in the Period 1960–87
Depreciation
in Advance Depreciation
Period a –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4
1960–66 c 15% 15% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30%
1967–74 d 15% 15% 15% 30% 30% 30% 30%
1975–76 e 15% 15% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30%
1977–81 15% 15% 15% 30% 30% 30% 30%
1982–85 f 15% 15% 25% 30% b 30% b 30% b 30% b
1986 g 20% 25% 25% 30% b 30% b 30% b 30% b
1987 g 25% 25% 25% 30% b 30% b 30% b 30% b
a The vessel is delivered in period 0, and the depreciation in period –2 and –1 is allowed before the de-
livery of the vessel.
b The balance of depreciation is corrected in accordance with increases in the rate of inflation.
c Proclamation number 199, 6 June 1957.
d Proclamation number 267, 15 June 1967.
e Proclamation number 292, 26 June 1975.
f Proclamation number 197, 18 May 1982.
g Proclamation number 767, 15 November 1986.Jensen 190
possible to take account of the policy shift before it is implemented.8 The
preannouncement of the depreciation policy is estimated by incorporating the vari-
ous depreciation policies shown in table 1 into the user cost in the year before the
change is implemented. Therefore, three different investment demand models have
been formulated. In model 1, the tax and depreciation rates are not allowed to influ-
ence the user cost of capital. It is assumed that the user cost, rtj −
0 , is dependent only
on the changes in the long-term interest rate of government bonds. Model 1 is ex-
pressed in equation (6), which is found by substituting the imputed before-tax user
cost of capital, rtj −
0 , into equation (5). Second, in investment model 2, the user cost
of capital, rtj
d
− , is modified with changes in the depreciation and tax legislation and
changes in the interest rate. However, any preannouncement of major depreciation
changes is not allowed. Model 2 is expressed in equation (7) by substituting the af-
ter-tax user cost of capital, rtj
d
− , in equation (5). Finally, in model 3 [equation (8)],
the user cost of capital, rtj
ad
− , is modified with the changes in depreciation, tax rates,
and interest rate. Moreover, it is assumed that major changes in depreciation policies
in the years 1967, 1975–76, 1982, 1986–87, are preannounced one year in advance,
allowing fishermen to incorporate these policy changes into the user cost of capital
earlier than in model 2.
The three estimated alternative investment demand models are:9
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To sum up, we have allowed capital demand to be influenced by the aggregated pro-
duction output and the relative user cost of capital. In addition, decision lags are as-
8 It has not been possible to verify the preannouncement assumption in interviews. However, the
preannouncement assumption is seen as a realistic assumption of information sharing in the Danish fisheries.
9 It is noted that the parameters of PC, pf, qn, and Tt are explicitly affecting investments through their
imputed effect on  rtj −
0 ,  rtj
d
− , and  rtj
ad
− .Investment Behavior and Tax Policy 191
sumed to take place in the capital formation process. The investment model is ex-
tended by inclusion of aggregated profit based on the inclusion of depreciation in
advance. It should be noted that emphasis is placed on analyzing the consequences
of the depreciation policy on capital demand. This is done by formulating alternative
investment models in which depreciation and tax policies are specified differently.
This allows us to test how the policies affect investment demand.
Data and Results
The data used to estimate the investment demand of the Danish fishing vessels in
the period between 1960 and 1987 are extracted from Danmarks Statistik (The Sta-
tistical Bureau of Denmark) and the Ministry of Food, Agricultural and Fisheries
(MFAF). A detailed description of the variables used in the estimations is outlined in
table 2. It should be noted that the net investment, ∆ Kt, in the fishing fleet is based
on the aggregated yearly changes in the registered insurance value of Danish fishing
vessels. In this sense, no exact measure of the investments is available. The insur-
ance values are based on information from insurance companies which are reported
in statistics at aggregated levels by Danmarks Statistik. This information is consid-
ered the best proxy for investment in Denmark because changes in the insurance
value of the single vessel will occur when the vessel is modernized and reported to
the insurance company. Moreover, the insurance value will include the value of new
vessels entering and vessels leaving the fishing fleet. Therefore, the fluctuation in
the insurance value is the best proxy available for the net investment in the Danish
fishing fleet. Secondly, it is assumed that wages are determined by use of opportu-
nity wage, wt, as suggested by Dupont (1988). Third, it is noted that the price devel-
opment of fishing vessels, PC, is necessary for calculating the user cost of capital.
Quantity PC is assumed to follow the general price index of capital equipment as re-
ported by Danmarks Statistik.
All results reported in table 3 are based on OLS estimation. In the general speci-
fications, all of the variables are included in accordance with equations (6) – (8).
The results in table 3 show that the profit, π t–2, and the variables of user cost of capi-
tal, including tax and depreciation policies, rw t
d
t −− 22 ,  rw t
ad
t −− 22 , are the only statis-
tically significant variables. The estimations confirm that the firms are investing due
to profit. Secondly, the general specifications verify that firms carefully consider the
level of the tax and the tax-deductible depreciation rates when planning investments.
Moreover, the importance of the tax legislation is also confirmed in model 1. That
is, when systematically excluding the tax and depreciation rates, as is the case for
rw tt −− 2
0
2 , the pre-tax user cost of capital is seen to be insignificant.
In the general specifications of equations (6) – (8), table 3 shows there are a
number of insignificant variables. In order to obtain nested specifications, the single
variables with the lowest t-statistics are successively deleted.  This procedure is fol-
lowed for each of the three models. The final nested specifications are found in ac-
cordance with the Theil Criterion (Maddala 1992, p. 497).
The result of the nested specifications in table 3 is similar to the impression in
the general specifications. That is, investments are influenced by the second order
distributed lag. This means that investments are dominated by the building of new
vessels. Moreover, the estimation results reject the hypothesis that investments are
influenced by long-term changes in the quantity of landings. In other words, there is
no evidence that the production output in the fisheries is restricting the vessel own-
ers’ incentives to invest. On the other hand, the estimations verify that both the user
cost of capital and profitability have had significant influence on investment behav-
ior in the Danish fishing fleet. The estimations indicate that the firms’ investmentJensen 192
Table 2
Measurement of Variables and Definitions
Variables Definitions
Kt The insurance value of the fishing vessels larger than 5 GRT.1 Observations for
the insurance value are missing in the years 1978, 1979, and 1980. These
missing observations are estimated by simple extrapolation assuming a
constant growth in capital during the period 1977–81.
Kt Approximated by use of the aggregated net investment measured in insurance
value of the Danish fleet. For instance, the net investment in 1966 is
measured by the change in the insurance capacity between 31 December
1965 and 31 December 1966, where the change in gross insurance value
measures the net investments—the gross investment minus the insurance
of the vessels leaving the fleet.
π t Profitability is calculated by dividing the gross fisheries earnings with
insurance of the vessels larger than 5 GRT in the current year.2
wt The labor cost index is based on the available opportunity salary. The opportu-
nity salary is based on the average salaries of seamen and machine
engineers.3
Qt Laspeyere quantity index on fish is based on calculation of an aggregated
quantity index from data on landed value and quantity for nineteen













































() for  
    : The price index on new capital is approximated by the national price index
of capital goods. This is a part of The Wholesales Price and Raw
Material Price Index, developed by Danmarks Statistik).5
pf: The development of price of fish is estimated based on the Paasche price
index, above, assumed to be 5.7% per annum based on the period
1958–87.6
qn: The producing capacity is assumed to follow a straight-line decline of 4%
per year.
s: The economic life of the capital is assumed to follow a decrease in
production capacity, which means that s = 25 year.
zn: Depreciation rate is based on the depreciation legislation outlined in table 1.
M: The taxable life of the vessel, denoted by M in equation (9), is assumed to
be fifteen years, of which the first two are depreciated in advance
before delivery of the vessel.
Tt: The tax rate used assumes that the vessel owners are taxed as sole-
proprietors and are taxed at the highest marginal income tax rate,
which has varied between 56% and 73% of net income.
1 Source: Various years, statistical yearbook (Danmarks Statistik).
2 Source: Gross earnings, various years, statistical yearbook (Danmarks Statistik). Source: Insurance
value, see above (Danmarks Statistik).
3 Source: Statistical yearbook (Danmarks Statistik).
4 Source: Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries.
5 Source: Various years, statistical yearbook (Danmarks Statistik).
6 Source: Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries.
7 It is noted that the parameters Zn, M, and Tt are not involved when imputing the user cost of capital
before tax,  rt
0 .
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behavior is rational. This means that they utilize the depreciation in advance tax
policy and also take into account the general changes in the depreciation and tax
policies. The latter is indicated by the fact that the user cost of capital, including tax
and depreciation changes, in models 2 and 3 are significant at the 5% level. More-
over, in model 1, the user cost of capital, exclusive of tax, is seen to be insignificant
at the 5% level.  In general, the estimations confirm that vessel owners are acting in
an economically rational way, and that it might be possible for policymakers to in-
fluence the investment pattern of the vessel owners by placing tax on the use of
capital.
In table 3 the Durbin Watson test (DW) for autocorrelation lies in the inconclu-
sive area for model 1. For models 2 and 3, the DW lies on the upper boundary, indi-
cating that there is no autocorrelation at the 5% level. In order to analyze the models
for higher-order autocorrelation, the LM test for autocorrelation is used, and the re-
sults are shown in table 4. In general, no indication of higher-order autocorrelation
is seen in any of the models. Moreover, all three models pass the ARCH, normality
tests, and the heteroskedasticity test at the 5% significance level.
Finally, in order to compare the three models, nonnested tests have been per-
formed and presented in table 5. First, when the null-hypothesis (H0) is the before-
Table 3
Investment Demand Explained by the Relative Cost of Capital and Profit Expectations
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent
∆  ln Kt General Specific General Specific General Specific
constant 0.95252 0.39215 0.63218 0.55174 0.65538 0.57875
(0.982) (1.933) (0.795) (3.797) (0.830) (3.898)
ln Kt–1 –0.029117 –0.054263 –0.090655 –0.085312 –0.093189 –0.090155
(–0.359) (–1.508) (–1.339) (–3.361) (–1.385) (–3.466)
ln Qt–1 –0.14224 –0.023053 –0.034746
(–0.617) (–0.120) (–0.183)














ln(π )t–1 –0.0059014 –0.051225 –0.055011
(–0.02) (–0.455) (–0.493)
ln(π )t–2 0.36987 0.35530 0.41562 0.38430 0.41204 0.38066
(3.093) (4.476) (4.381) (6.043) (4.399) (6.062)
R2 0.477745 0.458412 0.647930 0.637075 0.652733 0.642408
σ 0.070919 0.065928 0.058229 0.053969 0.057830 0.053571
RSS 0.100591 0.104315 0.067812 0.069903 0.066887 0.068876
DW 1.49 1.28 1.86 1.62 1.86 1.61
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.Jensen 194
tax investment model, all tests unambiguously show that both alternative hypotheses
(HA) of models 2 and 3, including taxation, are significant. This means that the H0,
as the before-tax investment model, is rejected against both models 2 and 3. More-
over, when testing the opposite hypothesis; i.e., model 2 and model 3 as H0, respec-
tively, and model 1 as HA, the tests show that the before-tax investment model is not
significant for variance encompassing the after-tax investment models. This means
that we can conclude that the after-tax investment models (models 2 and 3) encom-
pass the before-tax investment model (model 1). In this sense, the nonnested tests
verify the a priori expectation that the model using the before-tax user cost of capi-
tal is misspecified. When proceeding with the tests between investment models 2
and 3, it is noted that the difference between their estimates rests on the assumption
that major changes in depreciation are preannounced in model 3. In general, the
nonnested tests for models 2 and 3 in table 5 are inconclusive in the sense that they
reject variance between models 2 and 3. This means that the preannouncement of
major changes in the depreciation policy is not essential when describing investment
behavior in the fisheries. The announcement is, therefore, only seen to have minor
importance for the estimated investment demand. Therefore, the assumption of
Table 4
Diagnostic Tests
Model Tests Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
LM(1) 1 3.3889* 0.7348* 0.77959*
LM(2) 1.6309* 0.61667* 0.69963*
LM(3) 1.1574* 0.40752* 0.44726*
ARCH(1) 2 0.29595* 0.66897* 0.91265*
ARCH(2) 0.45775* 0.34243* 0.43901*
ARCH(3) 2.3366* 0.31542* 0.34221*
Heteroskedasticity 3 1.9216* 2.5871* 2.1944*
Normality 4 2.6427* 2.321* 2.6329*
Notes: * No misspecification at the 5% significant level.
1 Lagrange-multiplier F-test statistics for autocorrelation of order 1 to 3.
2 Lagrange-multiplier F-test statistics for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity of order 1 to 3.
3 Lagrange-multiplier F-test statistics for hetereoskedasticity related to the independent variables.
4 χ 2-test statistics for normality of error terms.
Table 5
Non-nested Tests of the Models (Variance Encompassing Tests)
H0 H1 J-test 1 F-test 2 COX 3
r0 rd 3.530* 12.458* –6.963*
rad 3.623* 13.128* –7.183*
rd r0 –1.151 1.186 1.092
rad 0.613 0.376 –0.745
rad r0 –1.151 1.324 1.146
rd –0.272 0.074 0.354
* Significant at the 5% significant level.
1 t-test (see Davidson and Mackinnon 1981).
2 F-test (see Maddala 1992, p. 500).
3 t-test (see Godfrey 1985, p. 74) Judge, et al. (1985, p. 883).Investment Behavior and Tax Policy 195
preannouncement is not critical in verifying the importance of depreciation policy
impact on investment demand.
Discussion and Policy Implications
In general, the results indicate that investment behavior is affected significantly by
the relative after-tax user cost of capital and profitability in the fisheries. The
policymakers should, therefore, examine the vessel owners’ incentives for invest-
ments. The general policy implication is that a relatively high tax rate, combined
with a tax system of depreciation in advance, yields an unintended incentive for the
vessel owners to invest immediately. The vessel owners are given incentives to in-
vest in a myopic manner based on tax considerations, rather than taking into account
the long-run economic prospects for the fisheries. If the goal is to reduce overcapac-
ity, then perhaps the current tax incentive to depreciate vessels prior to delivery
should be reconsidered. Although this seems to be a rather small policy change, it
could potentially provide incentive for firms to consider their future profitability as
well as the long-run economic impact of their actions to the fisheries prior to finaliz-
ing their investment decisions.
To reduce the tendency towards over-capacity in fisheries, it would be advisable
to affect the components influencing the firms’ investment behavior. It should be
noted that the decommissioning scheme applied in the European Union will only re-
duce fishing capacity in the short-run. Given that this scheme succeeds to reduce the
over-capacity temporarily, it will not change the fundamental incentives to invest—
there will still be a tendency towards over-capacity in the fisheries. If the tax and
depreciation policy cannot be changed for general policy reasons, a direct tax on
capital or a direct reduction of the rate of depreciation for tax purposes could be ap-
plied. The use of capital is influenced indirectly by the means in the common fisher-
ies policy; e.g., TAC, minimum mesh size, by-catch regulations, closed season, etc.
The impact of these policies on investment behavior is not analyzed in this study.
These fisheries policies will presumably affect the incentive to invest due to their
influence on profits. As emphasized by Squires (1987), the consequences of the fish-
eries instruments depend upon the specific technology involved in the single vessel
category. In this sense, the prediction of the impact of biological instruments on
profitability will contain significant variations among different vessel categories,
fishing areas, and years. It is, therefore, more straightforward to restrict the use of
capital by hindering capital subsidies and taxing the use of capital. These instru-
ments do not demand detailed knowledge of a single fishery, but can be used for all
vessel categories.
Given the presented results, the firms’ perceptions of how future fish stock
abundance influences investments is not explicitly discussed.  It is essential to note
that it is the single firm’s perceptions that are relevant, because it is the firm that
makes the decision to invest. Unfortunately, these perceptions are not observable.
However, it is likely that firms will predict the stock size based on the gross income
in the fisheries. In this sense, we argue that anticipation of the fish stocks is part of
the profit component included in the models. A way of modeling the fish stock size10
would be to construct a general index based on available biological estimates; e.g.,
in reports by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). How-
ever, given that the fishermen in Denmark never seem to agree with the biologists in
their prediction of the abundance of the fish stocks, it is not likely that the fishermen
10 This point was noted by an anonymous referee. See Bjørndal (1987) for an application.Jensen 196
would have expectations that come near the biologists’ predictions. To apply the
biological predictions, however, requires reliable information on stock abundance of
the species that have an important influence on investments.
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